Methods and techniques to protect against shoulder surfing and phishing attacks by Shi, Pei Pei
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES TO PROTECT AGAINST




The Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements





©Pei Pei Shi, 2010













Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-71049-4
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-71049-4
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library and
Archives Canada to reproduce,
publish, archive, preserve, conserve,
communicate to the public by
telecommunication or on the Internet,
loan, distribute and sell theses
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform,
paper, electronic and/or any other
formats.
The author retains copyright
ownership and moral rights in this
thesis. Neither the thesis nor
substantial extracts from it may be
printed or otherwise reproduced
without the author's permission.
AVIS:
L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive
permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver,
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public
par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter,
distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le
monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur
support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou
autres formats.
L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur
et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni
la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci
ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement
reproduits sans son autorisation.
In compliance with the Canadian
Privacy Act some supporting forms
may have been removed from this
thesis.
While these forms may be included
in the document page count, their
removal does not represent any loss
of content from the thesis.
Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la
protection de la vie privée, quelques
formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de
cette thèse.
Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans





School of Graduate Studies
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Pei Pei Shi
Entitled: Methods and Techniques to Protect Against Shoulder Surfing and
Phishing Attacks
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Applied Science in Information Systems Security
complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards with re-
spect to originality and quality.








Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director
_______________ 20
Dr. Nabil Esmail, Dean
Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science
ABSTRACT
Methods and Techniques to Protect Against Shoulder Surfing and Phishing
Attacks
Pei Pei Shi
Identity theft refers to the preparatory stage of acquiring and collecting someone else's
personal information for criminal purposes. During the past few years, a very large number
of people suffered adverse consequences of identity theft crimes.
In this thesis, we investigate different methods and techniques that can be used to pro-
vide better protection against identity theft techniques that have some hi-tech relevance
such as shoulder surfing of user's passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs),
phishing and keylogging attacks.
To address the shoulder surfing threat to traditional ?G? entry schemes, two new PIN
entry schemes are proposed. Both schemes achieve a good balance between security and
usability. In addition, our analysis shows that these two schemes are resilient to shoulder
surfing, given that the attacker has a limited capability in recording the login process.
We also propose a click-based graphical password authentication scheme. This scheme
aims at improving the resistance to shoulder surfing attacks while maintaining the merits of
iii
the click-based authentication solutions. It is also resilient to shoulder surfing attacks even
if the attacker can record the entire login process for one time with a video device.
Finally, in order to defend against online phishing attacks, we present a framework to
strengthen password authentication using mobile devices and browser extensions. The pro-
posed authentication framework produces a different password depending on the domain
name of the login site. Besides defending against phishing attacks, this solution does not
require any modifications at the server side.
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According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), identity theft refers to the
preparatory stage of acquiring and collecting someone else's personal information for crim-
inal purposes [44].
During the past few years, online identity theft became a very serious problem that
made millions of people all over the world suffer many kinds of adverse consequences.
Unfortunately, there are diverse techniques that can be adopted by online identity thieves
to obtain and exploit personal information. Consequently, it is not an easy task to propose
a single solution to defend against all of these attacks.
In this thesis, we investigate different methods and techniques that can be used to pro-
vide better protection against shoulder surfing and phishing attacks. In particular, we fo-
cus on protecting user's passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs). Despite
the fact that many security issues have been reported against password-based authentica-
tion protocols and many authentication protocols have been proposed to replace traditional
passwords authentication, the widespread application of these protocols still has a long way
to go. This is partially due to the fact that unlike other complex authentication schemes,
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such as zero-knowledge proofs [37], that may require high complexity to deploy and use,
password-based authentication is relatively very cheap and easy to use and deploy. Nowa-
days, most sites such as banks, e-mail service providers, online stores and social networking
sites, are still using password-based authentication techniques and this is very unlikely to
change in the near future. Thus passwords and PINs will remain the hot targets of identity
thieves.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
A recent report [4] indicated that 11.1 million people in US were victims of identity fraud
in 2009. The associated cost of these reported cases were estimated at about $54 billion.
Similarly, based on the report released by United Kingdom fraud prevention service, there
were 85,000 victims of impersonation and 24,000 victims of bank account takeovers in
2009. Compared to 2008, these two numbers increased by about 35% and 15%, respec-
tively. Based on the report by McMaster eBusiness Research Center (MeRC) [14], almost
1.7 million Canadians were the victims of some kind of identity fraud in 2007. Over 20
million hours and more than $150 million were spent in order to resolve these frauds. All
these startling numbers reveal the importance and urgency of the battle against identity
theft.
The security of most payment services at current terminal applications, such as Auto-
matic Teller Machine (ATM) and Point of Sale (PoS), are usually protected by a combina-
tion of certain unique information stored on a physical device, typically a magnetic stripe
card, and certain secret knowledge (e.g., PIN). A common risk of this type of protection
is that magnetic stripe cards can be stolen or skimmed by fake card readers. Once it hap-
pens, the security of the authentication scheme relies only on the protection of the PIN.
Unfortunately, recent reports [3, 6, 56] show that shoulder surfing attacks are already used
by criminals to obtain the PINs, and thus break into the accounts. This class of shoulder
2
surfing attacks has become a serious threat to many security applications that rely on the
combination of magnetic stripe cards and PINs to perform the authentication.
Unfortunately, terminal applications are not the only targets of attackers; current online
authentication systems suffer even more security risks. Phishing scam is one of the most
popular and effective methods adopted by attackers to collect sensitive information/creden-
tials from legitimate users. Sometimes, a forged website and/or a forged e-mail claiming to
originate from a given financial organization is usually enough to trick a novice, and thus
the cleartext password for the legitimate site is acquired by the attacker.
Over the last few years, various graphical authentication schemes were proposed as al-
ternatives to current text-based password authentication systems. This trend draws a lot
of attention from both academia and industry. The fast development of graphical authen-
tication is based on psychological studies, which indicate that the human brain is better at
recognizing and recalling visual information than verbal or textual information [40,51,71].
Researchers hope that this cognitive capability of people would allow the development of
more usable and secure authentication solutions.
Throughout this work, we focus on proposing and analyzing solutions to prevent or
mitigate shoulder surfing threats to terminal applications (e.g., ATM and PoS), shoulder
surfing issues of click-based graphical passwords and phishing attacks to online authenti-
cation systems.
The objectives of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Develop and evaluate new techniques to mitigate shoulder surfing attacks against
ATM and PoS terminal applications.
• Design, implement and evaluate a click-based graphical authentication scheme re-
silient to shoulder surfing attacks.
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• Design and develop an online authentication solution to protect against phishing at-
tacks.
1.3 Contributions
In this section, we briefly outline our contributions in the following three aspects: (1)
shoulder surfing threats to terminal applications; (2) shoulder surfing issues of click-based
graphical passwords; and (3) phishing attacks against online authentication systems. In
particular:
• We propose two new PIN entry schemes (namely, Position-based PIN Entry Scheme
and Rotary PIN Entry Scheme) to address the shoulder surfing threat. Both schemes
achieve a good balance between security and usability. In addition, our analysis
shows that these two schemes are resilient to shoulder surfing, given that the attacker
has a limited capability in recording the login process.
• We propose a click-based graphical authentication scheme inspired by Cued Click
Points (CCP) [9]. The scheme aims at improving the resistance to shoulder surf-
ing attacks while maintaining the merits of the CCP style click-based authentication
solutions. The proposed solution is resilient to shoulder surfing attacks even if the
attacker can record the entire PIN entry process one time with a video device.
• We design and implement a framework aiming at combating phishing and shoulder
surfing attacks while requiring no modification to the server side.
Some of the results presented in this thesis were partially published in [52,53].
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Shoulder surfing, phishing and keylogging
attacks are reviewed in the next chapter. In chapter 3, we present two PIN entry schemes
which are resistant to shoulder surfing attacks. Then, a graphical authentication scheme is
presented in chapter 4, followed by a solution to strengthen password authentication using
mobile devices and browser extensions in chapter 5. Finally, in chapter 6, we present a





There are several techniques for obtaining and exploiting personal information for identity
theft. Examples for these techniques include rummaging through rubbish for personal in-
formation (dumpster diving), retrieving personal data from redundant IT equipments and
disposed or carelessly placed storage media, using public records, stealing identification
cards, passports, or bank cards, typically by pickpocketing.
In this thesis we only focus on identity theft techniques with some hi-tech relevance.
In particular, we focus on shoulder surfing, phishing and keylogging. Countermeasures for
shoulder surfing are presented in chapters 3 and 4, while a countermeasure against online
phishing and keylogging is given in chapter 5. Other threats such as viruses and spywares
are out of the scope of this work.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Shoulder surfing is reviewed in section
2.2. In section 2.3, we introduce techniques used in phishing attacks as well as damages




As the name implies, shoulder surfing is used to obtain passwords, PINs or other sensi-
tive information through observation, such as by looking over someone's shoulder. It is
a simple, yet effective, method to get information especially in crowded places such as
coffee-shops where it is relatively easy to stand next to or behind someone without being
noticed.
Protection against shoulder surfing has received a lot of attention by researchers since
the beginning of 21s* century, especially with the widespread use of ATMs and PoSs, where
many solutions are proposed in order to mitigate shoulder surfing issues in different sce-
narios.
Obviously, the effectiveness of shoulder surfing attacks is highly dependent on the
shoulder surfer's capability to record the victim's login process. In this thesis, we dis-
tinguish two types of shoulder surfing attacks based on the recording capabilities of the
adversaries. Shoulder surfing are classified as cognitive shoulder surfing and recording-
based shoulder surfing. In the former, the shoulder surfer depends on the shoulder surfer's
cognitive capability to retain PINs or other sensitive information. This type of attacks is
relatively easy to defend against due to the limited cognitive capabilities of human be-
ings [38,60]. In contrast, in the latter, the accuracy of recording sensitive information has
been significantly improved with the help of concealed miniature cameras or video mobile
phones. It should be noted that recording-based shoulder surfing is not a pure theoretical
possibility. In fact, recent reports [3, 6, 56] show that recording-based shoulder surfing at-




The Anti-phishing working group (APWG) [1] defined phishing as follows [2]:
Phishing is a criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and tech-
nical subterfuge to steal consumers' personal identity data and financial ac-
count credentials. Social-engineering schemes use spoofed e-mails purporting
to be from legitimate businesses and agencies to lead consumers to counterfeit
websites designed to trick recipients into divulging financial data such as user-
names and passwords. Technical-subterfuge schemes plant crimeware onto
PCs to steal credentials directly, often using systems to intercept consumers
online account user names and passwords - and to corrupt local navigational
infrastructures to misdirect consumers to counterfeit websites (or authentic
websites through phisher-controlled proxies used to monitor and intercept con-
sumers' keystrokes).
The phishing technique was firstly described in detail in a paper and presentation delivered
to the International HP Users Group, Interex [12] in 1987. The first recorded mention of
the term "phishing" is on the alt.online-service.America-online (Usenet newsgroup) [43]
on January 2, 1996. From that time, researchers have started the war with this attack.
However, nowadays, phishing is still one of the most prevalent attacks on the Internet. For
example, APWG reported 49084 unique phishing websites detected in June 2009, which is
the second-highest number recorded since APWG began reporting.
2.3.1 Phishing Techniques
Phishers are able to "Phish" for users' personal information in various ways, of which
fraudulent e-mails claiming to be from users' banks or some financial institutions are the
most common. Usually, a user is informed that the account has a problem which needs
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to be resolved immediately. A malicious link is usually included in the e-mail. When the
user clicks on it, the victim is directed to a spoofed website which is genuinely looking the
same as the legitimate one. When the user enters account information (e.g., username and
password), these credentials are relayed to the phisher.
Another way to perform phishing attacks is through telephones which does not require
a fake or spoofed website at all. In this attack scenario, short messages claimed to be from
banks or financial institutions are sent to users in which users are informed that they should
call a number regarding problems with their accounts. When users dial the number, they
are asked to enter their credentials. Some phishers even use fake caller-ID through VoIP
to deceive users that calls are from a trusted organization [54]. Instant Messages is also an
option for phishing.
Besides these traditional phishing approaches, phishing attacks are continuously evolv-
ing into more sophisticated forms. A recent tendency is that attacks have been directed
specifically at senior executives and other high value individuals within financial institu-
tions. This kind of attacks, termed spear-phishing [35,46], usually tries to deceive victims
into installing malware or disclosing valuable credentials about their organizations. In order
to convince the victims more easily, advanced phishers include some exploited information
of victims into their phishing scams [27]. As a result, this so called context-aware phishing
attack, dramatically enhances the probability of success, from 3% percent for a common
attack to 48-96% for a deliberately spoofed context-aware attack [27]. Social networks
present another hot target for phishers where they can easily obtain a large amount of infor-
mation about thousands of individuals. This information can be harvested later on in order
to craft e-mails claiming to come from someone the victim knows or even trusts.
Since phishing e-mails and phishing websites are most common among these phishing
techniques, we will address these two methods used by these attacks in the following two
subsections.
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2.3.2 Phishing E-mail Methods
The objective of a phishing e-mail is to entice the receiver to read the e-mail and click on
the link inside it. In order to achieve this goal, some methods are adopted by phishers, such
as forging the address of the sender, enticing subject lines, using genuine looking content
and disguised links [25]. In what follows, we briefly summarize these methods.
• Spoofed senders' address. To forge the address of a sender is quite easy nowadays.
A forged e-mail address, which looks like the one it claims to be, is usually used
by phishing e-mails. For example, the forged address service @rbc.ca can be used
in order to convince the recipient that this e-mail comes from the Royal Bank of
Canada.
• Beguiling subject lines. Phishing e-mails usually try to have an attractive subject
line which seems to originate from the related financial institutions. Apparently, the
intention is to urge the user to open this e-mail. For instance, a beguiling subject line
may look like this: You have one new messagefrom Royal Bank of Canada. Besides,
some phishing e-mails use misspelled key words to bypass spam filters, which some
users may not identify when they quickly scan the subject line.
• Genuine looking content. Normally, phishers copy the images, logos and text styles
from the legitimate website in order to make their phishing e-mails look genuinely.
Moreover, some of the phishing e-mails may even have genuine links to the institu-
tion's term of use, privacy policy and other pages on the legitimate website, which
deceives some unsuspecting users. Some trusts and authentication marks are also
copied to convince receivers the authenticity of the e-mail.
• Disguised links. A deliberately disguised link, which is very significant, is usu-
ally provided in the phishing e-mail aiming at deceiving the recipient. If HTML
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is enabled in the e-mail, this link is displayed as a genuine Uniform Resource Lo-
cator (URL). However, when the user clicks on it, it redirects the user to a differ-
ent website. For example, a hyperlink in a phishing e-mail that I have recently
received is RBC Royal Bank ONLINE. When I clicked on it, I was redirected to
http://feltd.gotadsl.co.uk/royal.html. In text only e-mails, spoofed links contain the
"@" symbol. For example, a spoofed URL may look like http://www.genm
nesite.com@phishing.com. This URL takes the victim to http://www.phishing.com
instead of http://www.genuinesite.com.
• E-mail form. Instead of providing a disguised link, some phishing e-mails con-
tain a form for recipients to enter their personal information or account information
and click the "submit", "send" or "update" button. Forms within e-mails are used
together with script language located on a remote server to receive the submitted in-
formation and either forward the information to the phishers, or save the information
in a database for the future use.
2.3.3 Phishing Website Methods
The objective of phishing attacks is to acquire personal information, especially financial
credentials. In order to achieve this goal, phishers have to convince users that they are
dealing with genuine sites since users will not disclose their credentials to untrusted sites
or organizations. Consequently, phishing sites which support the phishing e-mails usually
mirror the claimed legitimate sites. Several methods are utilized by phishers to achieve this
goal, such as disguising the URL in the address bar and using genuine looking images and
text [26].
• Genuine-looking URLs. Some phishing websites simply register a domain name
similar to the one of the targeted organization or institution. In this case, these two
URLs look like each other. As a result, some users may not be able to identify the
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spoofed one from the genuine one. For instance, phishers may use the domain name
of http://www.gooogle.com, where the actual domain is http://www.google.com.
• Fake address bar. Some phishers utilize a more technical way to deceive users. This
method involves the removal of the address bar and building a fake address bar using
images and text with the help of script languages. When a user clicks on the URL in
the phishing e-mail, a new browser window is opened without the original address
bar, and sometimes without the status bar. A false address bar constructed by HTML,
XML User Interface Language (XUL) and JavaScript is displayed in place of the
original one. The straightforward way to defend against this class of phishing attacks
is to disable scripts, from browser settings, which is usually not a very practical
solution since most sites need these scripts.
• Genuine looking content. Phishing websites usually utilize copied images, logos
and text styles of the legitimate site to make the phishing site looks the same as the
genuine one. Moreover, some of the phishing pages even have genuine links to the
target institution's term of use, privacy policy, products, and other pages from the
legitimate website. Furthermore, some trusts and authentication marks (e.g., Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) locks on the status bar) are also copied to convince the victims
the authenticity of the phishing site.
• Pop-up windows. When this method is utilized by the phisher, a genuine webpage
is opened in the background by script. Meanwhile, a small bare pop-up window
(without address bar, status bar and scrollbars) is also opened by script on top of the
genuine webpage. Through this, phishers attempt to convince users that these two
windows are associated with each other, i.e., they both belong to the same organi-
zation. As mentioned above, it is hard to defend against this technique by disabling
scripts.
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2.3.4 Damages Caused by Phishing Scams
Generally, the ultimate objective of phishing scams is financial benefit. Several ways are
used by phishers to achieve this financial goal using the collected personal information. In
what follows, we briefly review some of the possible damages caused by phishing attacks
[24].
• Hijacking user accounts. In here, accounts do not necessarily mean bank accounts.
E-mail accounts and social network site accounts can also be the valuable targets
to attackers. Phishers handle information gathered by different accounts in diverse
ways. If the information of a given bank account is provided by the victim, the fraud-
sters may empty the victim's bank account, e.g., by electronically transferring money
to a temporary account created by them using someone else's personal information.
And then, withdraw the money from that account before being noticed by the victim.
Cashing fake cheques on the victim's account is another option for the phisher.
• ATM card duplication. Some phishing websites require users to provide informa-
tion about their ATM cards. With this information, it is possible for phishers to
duplicate ATM cards which are linked to victims' debit accounts. When this is done,
the victims' account can be emptied by ATM withdrawals.
• Unauthorized use of credit cards. If the victim provides detailed information about
the credit card to the phisher, it is very easy for the phisher to make unauthorized
purchases through the Internet.
• Identity theft. Even if users provide their non-financial accounts information or just
personal information to phishers, it is still dangerous because phishers can apply for
credit cards using this stolen information, sell information to criminal organization
or launch spear-phishing attacks with the help of this information.
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2.4 Keylogging
Keylogging, sometimes called keystroke logging, is the practice of tracking or monitoring
each keystroke, or mouse movement, of users on a given computer. Usually, this tracking
is done in a covert manner so that the victim is unaware of it. Keylogging can be done
through dedicated hardware devices or through pure softwares.
2.4.1 Hardware-based Keyloggers
As a hardware device, a keylogger is a small sized plug which works as a connector between
the keyboard and the computer. This kind of device usually looks like an ordinary keyboard
plug, thus users may not pay much attention to it. All hardware keylogger devices have the
following two components [67]:
• Microcontroller. This component is intend to interpret every keystroke typed by the
user, process it if necessary and then save it to the non-volatile memory.
• Non-volatile memory. This part is intend to save data passed by microcontroller,
and retain it even when power is off. Flash memory is a good choice for this module.
Compared to software-based keyloggers, hardware-based ones can track any user input
from the time a computer is turned on. Consequently, even the password for the basic
input/output system (BIOS) or disk encryption software can also be interpreted. Usually, a
pre-defined character string is needed to access the logged data which is saved in internal
memory of the hardware by the keylogger. Typically this memory may range from a few
kilobytes to several megabytes, and usually each keystroke recorded cost a byte of memory.
In here, we describe few kinds of hardware keyloggers [67].
• Keyboard hardware. This kind of keylogger is usually a hardware circuit that is
attached somewhere between the computer keyboard and the computer (e.g., key-
board's cable connector). Some of these implementations are designed to have an
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innocuous appearance, while others even can be installed or built into standard key-
boards and consequently will not be visible externally. An internal memory is equipped
into these types of keyloggers aiming at recording all keystrokes. The saved keystrokes
can be accessed subsequently, for instance, by inputting a pre-defined secret pass-
word or key sequences [29].
• Firmware-based. In this case, the computer's BIOS, which is typically responsi-
ble for handling keyboard events, is modified to record these events when they are
processed.
• Wireless Keylogger sniffers. This type of keylogger is designed to collect packets
of data being transferred from a wireless keyboard to the computer. If the communi-
cation channel between a wireless keyboard and a computer is secured by encryption,
the deployed encryption needs to be cracked in order to acquire the collected infor-
mation.
• Keyboard overlays. A recent report [31] has shown that criminals have utilized key-
board overlays on ATM machines to record users' PINs. Each keypress is registered
by this malicious device as well as the legitimate one that the user is using.
2.4.2 Software-based Keyloggers
Software-based keyloggers are programs which can either be downloaded to a particular
computer by someone who is intend to monitor the users of this computer, or downloaded
as a Spyware and executed as part of a rootkit or trojan horse while the legitimate user is un-
aware of its existence. A keylogger program typically has two parts: a dynamic link library
(DLL) and an executable file (.EXE) [50]. All the recording workload is done by the DLL
while the executable file is designed to install the DLL and trigger it to work. Similar to the
hardware-based keyloggers, each keystroke typed by the user is recorded by this program
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and uploaded to the owner of this keylogger through a covert channel over the Internet.
This covert communication can be achieved in different ways, for example, recorded data
can be uploaded to a website, database or emailed to a pre-defined e-mail address. From a
technical perspective, we can classify keylogger programs into five categories [68]:
• Hypervisor-based. In this case, keylogger program can theoretically reside in a
malware hypervisor which is running underneath the operating system. Blue Pill is a
conceptual example [65].
• Kernel-based. This type of keyloggers resides at the kernel level and, thus, is diffi-
cult to be detected, especially for user-mode applications. These keylogger programs
are usually implemented in the form of rootkits which are very powerful since they
can subvert the operating system kernel and gain unauthorized access.
• Hook-based. The idea of this type of keylogger is to hook the keyboard using the
functionality provided by the operating system for some applications subscribed to
keyboard events. When this hook action is successfully done, each keypress is noti-
fied by the operating system to the keylogger, and the latter simply records it.
• Passive methods. Some operating system APIs (e.g., GetAsyncKeyState()) are used
in this kind of keyloggers to poll the state of the keyboard or to subscribe to keyboard
events. These keylogger programs are relatively easy to write, but easy to be detected
since they can cause a noticeable increase in Central Processing Unit (CPU) usage as
a result of the constant polling of each keypress.
• Web form Grabbers. Instead of recording each keystroke of the keyboard, web
form grabbers keyloggers record the web browsing "onSubmit" event functions in
order to get the web form submissions. This method records data before it is passed
over the Internet.
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Besides the methods mentioned above, some keyloggers can be augmented with additional
capabilities such as:
• Clipboard logging. These keylogger programs have the ability to record anything
that has been copied to the clipboard.
• Screen grabbers. In this case, keylogger programs can take Screenshots to capture
graphics-based information. Some of them may take the whole screen while oth-
ers just take partial screen around the mouse clicks. Conceptually, these keylogger
programs are similar to the record-based shoulder surfing.
The ultimate goal of keylogging is not merely collecting personal information. Sim-
ilar to phishing attacks, stealing personal information is just the first step. Keyloggers
are mainly financially-motivated. There are even some keyloggers that are identified as
phishing-based keyloggers, and a significant increase of this class of key loggers has been
reported by APWG [20].
Most of the ways mentioned in section 2.3.4 can be adopted by attackers using keylog-
gers in order to achieve financial benefits from the stolen personal information.
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Chapter 3
PIN Entry Schemes Resistant to
Shoulder Surfing
3.1 Introduction
Authentication mechanisms play a central role in the protection of systems that offer per-
sonalized financial services such as ATMs and POSs. Currently, the security of ATMs and
POSs are protected by a combination of a physical token, typically a magnetic card, and
certain secret knowledge (e.g., PIN). Both of these factors are needed for successful au-
thentication to such systems. A common risk of this type of protection is that magnetic
stripe cards can be stolen or skimmed by fake card readers. Once it happens, the security of
the authentication scheme relies only on the protection of PINs, which is subjected to the
different types of attacks discussed in chapter 2. In this chapter, we investigate the design
of PIN entry schemes that are resistant to shoulder surfing attacks.
To address the shoulder surfing issues, several challenge-response-based approaches are
proposed [48, 61, 64]. In order to protect users' PINs, these schemes usually require users
to interact with systems multiple rounds and do not provide direct feedback. As a result,
the login procedure can be very long [61, 64], which makes these schemes unsuitable for
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many practical scenarios. Hence, it is desirable to design solutions applicable in scenarios
where both security and reasonably fast response time are important.
Further security protection beyond the combination of a magnetic stripe card and PIN
includes biometrie authentication [33] and one-time keypad [49,58] which are quite widely
used. However, there also exist specific types of attacks aiming at these solutions. For
instance, many commercial fingerprint scanners can be reliably fooled using a combination
of cheap kitchen supplies and a digital camera [34]. Detailed discussions about biometrie
authentication and one-time keypad are out of the scope of this thesis.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we present two new PIN entry schemes that are
designed in order to mitigate shoulder surfing attacks.
• Position-based PIN Entry Scheme. In this scheme, the PIN is not a sequence of 4
digits but a sequence of 4 locations chosen in a specific table displayed to the user.
Compared to previous work, our scheme achieves a good balance between security
and usability. Our analysis shows that this design can offer a strong security pro-
tection against adversaries with limited surfing capability, e.g, when the adversary is
limited to acquiring only up to two records of the whole login process. The usability
issue is addressed from two aspects: the time required by the authentication process
and the interface design. Our scheme has a short response time and yet still provides
a strong protection against shoulder surfing attacks.
• Rotary PIN Entry Scheme. This rotary PIN entry scheme has a few variants. Each
variant provides the option of balancing security conditions against two types of po-
tential risks, namely, random guessing and shoulder surfing assisted guessing. More
importantly, a thorough security analysis is conducted in order to give a quantitative
guidance on choosing an appropriate option according to a system's specific security
requirements. Unlike previous work, instead of emphasizing the robustness of a spe-
cific scheme against a particular type of attack, we indicate that there is a trade-off
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between protections against different types of risks, and thus the selection of an ap-
propriate scheme should be application-dependent, i.e., by considering the types and
frequencies of risks faced in the application. A usability study is also included.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Related work is reviewed in section
3.2. The details of our schemes are presented in section 3.3, followed by security analysis
in section 3.4 and section 3.5. In section 3.6 and section 3.7, we discuss the usability issues
of the proposed schemes.
3.2 Related Work
Roth et al. [48] proposed a PIN entry method which offers limited resilience against shoul-
der surfing. In their method, the keys on the keypad are randomly partitioned into two sets,
one set is white while the other is black. Depending on the set to which the digit of the PIN
under verification belongs, the user enters the key with the same color as the set. Multiple
rounds are needed to complete the input of a single digit of the PIN. The same process is
repeated until the whole 4-digit PIN is entered. Their method has three variants: Imme-
diate Oracle Choices (IOC), Delayed Oracle Choices (DOC) and probabilistic cognitive
trapdoor game. The first two are secure against cognitive shoulder surfing, but are vulnera-
ble to recording-based shoulder surfing. The probabilistic cognitive trapdoor game variant
offers limited resilience to recording-based shoulder surfing. It aims at the case where a
shoulder surfer may acquire one record of the whole login process.
Weinshall [61] proposed two challenge response protocols, one with a high complexity
query and the other with a low complexity query. In both protocols, users need to answer a
sequence of challenges posed by the login terminal. The challenges are based on a shared
secret between the login terminal and the user, which is a fixed set of pictures divided
into two sub-groups. As indicated by the authors, this scheme has two weaknesses: users
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need to be trained in order to familiarize them with their associated secrets, e.g., a set of
pictures; and the authentication process may take longer time than alternate methods. A
later work by Golle and Wagner [18] shows that Weinshall's protocols are vulnerable to a
certain attack that leverages a SAT solver. This attack can recover the user's PIN in few
seconds after recording only a small number of successful logins.
The Convex Hull Click Scheme (CHC) [64] is another multiple-round challenge-response
authentication scheme proposed to defend against shoulder surfing. In this scheme, users
needs to select a set of icons, out of a larger number of icons, as their password icons. Dur-
ing the login process, to respond to the challenge, the user must virtually find three or more
of her password icons, mentally create a convex hull formed by these icons, and then click
inside this convex hull. The user must respond to the multiple challenges correctly in order
to be authenticated to the system. As a result, the login time can be very long. According
to their simulation results, the mean time for correct password inputs is around 72 seconds.
PassFaces [42] relies on the user's capability of recognizing faces. The user first needs
to choose a set of faces as the secret, and have a few minutes of training to be familiar
with the chosen faces. The login may take several rounds. For each round, among all the
faces displayed only one belongs to the secret set. The user needs to identify those faces in
the secret set correctly in order to pass the authentication. This method is designed to be
resilient against cognitive shoulder surfing.
3.3 Proposed PIN Schemes
3.3.1 System and Adversary Models
In this chapter, we assume that the verifier (e.g., the ATM) is trusted to perform the authenti-
cation process correctly, and the alphabet of PIN digits is {0, 1,. . . , A-I }, e.g., {0, 1,. . . , 9},
although it can be readily extended to generic characters instead of digits. Let L denote the
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number of digits in the secret PINs. Throughout the rest of this chapter, the default value of
L is 4. As to the capability of adversaries, we assume that they can obtain the information
stored on the magnetic stripe card (e.g., by pickpocketing or by fake card readers) and thus
the protection of the authentication mechanism relies solely on the security of PINs.
Below, we consider three adversary models. The first type is called a Zero-knowledge
adversary, in which the adversary only has the card (e.g., picking up a card by chance),
but does not have any knowledge about the PIN. Thus the only option available for the
adversary in this case is to launch a random guessing attack. The other two considered
adversary models are cognitive shoulder surfing and recording-based shoulder surfing. In
particular, in recording-based shoulder surfing, we assume that the adversaries can acquire
only one record of the entire login process. We argue that such an assumption is reasonable
in most applications that are protected by the combination of a magnetic stripe card and
a PIN. For example, even if the adversary can install a concealed miniature camera over
the input screen of an ATM, the probability that the camera can record two or three login
processes of the same user on the same ATM within a reasonable time frame is practically
slim.
We assume that the verifier keeps a record on the number of successive failed inputs.
After three failed attempts, the verifier will retain the card and terminate the usage of the
related account on any ATM, until the PIN is reset through a secure channel, e.g., at a bank
branch. In addition, for convenience, this counter is automatically reset upon a successful
login. We are aware of the fact that this rule may be misused to launch discontinuous
attacks. More specifically, a smart attacker may first make two guesses. If the attacker
fails, she will wait until the counter is reset, before trying another two. Hence, in our
design, the legitimate user will be notified by previous failed login attempts (if any) upon a
successful login. As a result, the maximum number of retries that the adversary can make
without being detected is two.
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Throughout the rest of this chapter, we focus our discussion on the ATM environment,
although our scheme is also be applicable to other scenarios such as PoS terminals and
portable digital assistants (PDAs).
3.3.2 Position-based PIN Entry Scheme
For each login, after the user inserts her bank card into the ATM, the machine displays an
AxA table, each cell of which contains a number from the set {0, 1, . . . , A — 1}. The
assignments of numbers to cells are executed in such a way that A copies of every number
in the set are randomly assigned to the cells in the table. Since the PIN in our scheme is a
sequence of 4 positions, in the first step, the user needs to input the number displayed within
the cell corresponding to the first position. Afterwards, a new AxA table is generated,
and the second number is keyed in according to the second position. The same process is
repeated until the user has input 4 numbers. At the end of the login process, if the user
inputs all the numbers correctly according to the secret, i.e., the sequence of 4 positions,
she is authorized to access the account.
The assignments of numbers to the cells in any two displays are completely indepen-
dent. Note that, although the whole login process consists of four steps, unlike previous
work [48, 61,64], there is only one-round selection per PIN digit in our scheme.
Besides the random assignments of numbers, during the generation of tables, we also
consider introducing a colorful display to improve the usability of our scheme, which is
discussed in section 3.6. Since the distribution of colors are determined independently
from the assignments of numbers, security analysis presented in section 3.4 is applicable
to both the general scheme without colors and the colored designs presented in section 3.6.
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3.3.3 Rotary PIN Entry Scheme
Here, the intension is to design a secure yet user friendly PIN entry scheme. In addition,
in order to provide different options for balancing security levels against zero-knowledge
adversary and shoulder surfers, our scheme contains two parameterized variants: Variant
One (VO(N)) and Variant Two (VT(N)).
Variant One
Suppose that the user has inserted the bank card into an ATM, and her personal PIN of the
card is XiX2Xy1Xi, (Xi G {0, 1,. . . , A-l}). In this variant, after the welcome message,
the verifier displays a set of L co-centered rotating wheels each of which is equally divided
into A sectors as shown in Figure 1 . Each sector is marked with a digit randomly chosen
from the alphabet, i.e., 0 to A — 1, and each digit in the alphabet is displayed exactly once
within each circle. Circles can be rotated either clockwise or anticlockwise. We denote
the four circles from the innermost to the outermost as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th circle,
respectively. To input the PIN, the user needs to align all PIN digits along one sector in the
correct sequence, i.e., align Xi in the ith circle. A control button is pressed to indicate the
completion of the PIN alignment process.
Upon the completion of the ?G? entry process, there are A aligned inputs contained in
the wheel. For example, assume that Figure 1 shows the final input of a PIN entry pro-
cess, the aligned inputs include {8121,9243,7774,5838,3985,6607,2496,1012,4559,0360}.
The verifier checks all these potential PINs. If any of them matches the genuine PIN cor-
responding to the bank card inserted, the verifier will give the user access to the linked
account. Otherwise, an error message is displayed, and the counter of the number of suc-
cessive PIN entry failures is increased by 1 .
The above scheme, called VO(I), can be generalized into VO(N) by dividing each
circle into NxA sectors, instead of A sectors. In this case, each digit in the alphabet is
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Figure 1: Example for VO(I)
Figure 2 shows an alternate graphical user interface (GUI) for VO(I) that might be
appropriate in some applications.
Insert Card
2:9 O i 1 I 3 ^ 4 8 ! 5 7 6 ;
; 1 5 6 2 4 738 09
0 5 3:1 2 ! 7 ¦ 8 ' 9 64
1 4 08 97 53 6:2
Enter PIN
Figure 2: An alternate GUI for VO(I)
Variant Two
Similar to VO, each circle is equally divided into A sectors, and each digit in the alphabet is








as shown in Figure 3. As a result, in order to input a 4-digit PIN, VT needs two rounds to
complete the PIN entry process. More specifically, XiX2 and X3X4 are entered in round
one and round two, respectively. Note that, the position of the aligned input XxX2 is not
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Figure 3: Example for VT(I)
After the two rounds, the verifier checks all A potential PINs and verifies whether there
exists an input equal to the genuine PIN. Based on the result of the verification, the verifier
will grant or deny the access to the corresponding account.
Again, VT(I) can be generalized in the same as VO(N) by dividing each circle of the
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wheel into NxA sectors, instead of A sectors. Then each digit in the alphabet is displayed
exactly N times, instead of once, within a circle. Due to the limitation on the display area
of an ATM machine, the typical setting of N is 1, 2 or 3.
3.4 Security Analysis of the Position-based PIN Entry Scheme
3.4.1 Cognitive Shoulder Surfing
There has been some interesting research on the cognitive capabilities of human beings. In
1956, Miller [38] noted that the limitation on short term memory (STM) is 7 plus or minus
2 symbols. A more recent work by Vogel et al. [60] shows that STM of normal people
is limited to three to four symbols. Few subjects were able to remember five symbols in
their STM throughout the experiments conducted in [60]. This discovery is based on the
neurophysiological evidence.
For the position-based PIN entry scheme, there are AxA numbers on the ATM screen
per display/step and only one number is input by the user at a time. If we define the combi-
nation of the number that a user inputs at one step and the corresponding A positions as a
knowledge set, then the whole login process generates 4 knowledge sets. According to pre-
vious research in human's cognitive capabilities [38, 60], remembering all the knowledge
sets are far beyond the cognitive capabilities of a typical human being adversary.
3.4.2 Recording-based Shoulder Surfing
Compared to cognitive shoulder surfing, the adversary is much more powerful in recording-
based shoulder surfing. Some schemes aiming at the former [42] can be trivially broken
by a recording-based shoulder surfing even when the adversary has a relatively limited
recording capability. In this section, we concentrate on security analysis of our scheme




If one record of the whole login process is available, a shoulder surfer can limit the guess
within the knowledge sets. More specifically, the shoulder surfer randomly chooses a posi-
tion from the set of positions assigned with the same value as the input. For each position
of the PIN, the probability of making a correct guess is 1/A Thus, the probability of iden-
tifying the whole PIN is 1/A4, which ranges from 0.16% to 0.01% when the value of A
varies from 5 to 10.
Two Login Records
We first evaluate the probability that a shoulder surfer can successfully guess the first po-
sition of the PIN, given that she can obtain two records of the whole login process. Let us
denote this probability as P\ .
In our design, each number in the set (i.e., {0, 1, . . . , A - 1 }) is repeated A times in a
table. Given that the user entered a number ? for the first position during a login process,
the shoulder surfer can deduce that the actual position is among the set of A cells assigned
with the number ? by checking the corresponding record. Let L\ = {l\, l\, . . . , I1 _1} and
L2 = {¿0; ¿I, · · · , I21] denote the sets of locations corresponding to the first input from
the user in the first record and the second record, respectively. Therefore, there is at least
one element that belong to both L\ and L2, since the actual first position of the PIN must
be included in both sets.
Let E denote the set of positions that belong to both L1 and L2. Thus, 1 < \E\ < A.
Obviously, when \E\ = 1, the shoulder surfer can uniquely identify the first position of the
PIN, i.e., the only element in set E. In a more general case, the best strategy of a shoulder
surfer is to pick a position from set E, and the success rate of the guess is equal to l/\E\.
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As a result, P1 can be calculated as:
A 1
pi = S im ¦ Pi· ?*" (1)|£|=1 ' !
where P11 1£| denotes the probability that there are \E\ elements in common between the
two sets of possible positions of the first inputs in the two login processes.
Since the actual first position of the PIN must be in both L1 and L2, P1, \e\ is equivalent
to the possibility that the number of elements in common between two sets, each of which
is formed by randomly picking A-I cells from the remained A2 - I cells, is \E\. Thus,
we have:
r\E\-l rA-l-(\E\-l) n\E\-l nA~\E\
^. m ^JTi = —^XZ1 (2)^A2-l UA2-1
By combining Equation (1) and Equation (2), we can calculate P1 as follows:
A r\E\-l rA-\E\
Fl~ L1Tm -Fa=I (3)
Let P2, Pz, and P4 denote the probability that the shoulder surfer correctly guesses the
second, third and fourth digits of the PIN after two records, respectively, given that she can
obtain two records of the whole login process. Let PPIN denote the probability that the
shoulder surfer correctly guesses the whole PIN given two records. Thus, we have:
PpiN = Pi -P2 -P3-A (4)
Since the table is reset before each input from the user, if the 4 positions of the PIN are
totally independent from each other, P¿'s (i G {1, 2, 3, 4}) have the same value. Thus, we
have:
Ppin - P1 (5)
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According to Equation (5), the success rate of a shoulder surfer correctly guesses the whole
PIN ranges from 25% to 20%, when the size of the table (i.e., A) is set from 5 to 10. Since
the maximum number of retries that the adversary can make without being detected is 2,
our scheme can provide sufficient protection given that the shoulder surfer can acquire two
login records.
3.5 Security Analysis of the Rotary PIN Entry Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the two variants of this scheme under three
types of adversary models, i.e., zero-knowledge (ZK) adversary, recording-based shoulder
surfing (RSS) and cognitive shoulder surfing (CSS). Let P\¿ür denote the probability that
an adversary successfully gets the secret PIN within r attempts in a specific variant of this
scheme under one of the three adversary models, where Ad and Var denote an adversary
model and a variant of the scheme, respectively. In the following, we first analyze each
adversary model when r = 1, and then discuss the case when r = M, where M is the
maximum number of successive PIN entry failures allowed, before the verifier retains the
card and suspends the usage of the relevant account.
3.5.1 Zero-knowledge Adversary
Under the zero-knowledge adversary model, the adversary knows nothing about the secret
PIN, and thus can only launch a random guessing attack.
In VO(N), whatever choice the adversary makes, N ? A distinct inputs are submitted
for the verification. Thus, we have:
^VO(N) _ NxA = N_
A4 A3
pVU( ^ ~~ _ ^_rZK-\ ~ ?? — Al W
Note that, as shown in Equation (6), j^ is an approximation of PZK . This is due to the
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fact that, except for the case N = I where the above expression corresponds to the exact
value of P2K , for N > 1, there may exist repeated values among all the NxA inputs
submitted. Since in our design N is a small number (e.g., 2 or 3), such an approximation
is acceptable.
Similarly, for VT(N) where the two rounds of the PIN entry process are executed
independently from each other, we have
pVT(N) _ pVT(N) J3VT(N)rZK-\ — 2I ' r2
^, NxA NxA _ N±
~ A2 ' A2 ~ A2
where P1 and P2 denote the probability that in VT(N) an adversary inputs the
secret ??X-¿ and X3X4 in the first and second rounds, respectively.
3.5.2 Recording-based Shoulder Surfing
In the following analysis, under the recording-based shoulder surfing model, we assume
that the adversary acquires one record of the whole PIN entry process. All variants of
this scheme fail, if the adversary can obtain more than one record of the whole PIN entry
process.
In VO(I), an adversary can easily deduce that the secret PIN is among the A distinct
aligned inputs. Apparently, PRSs-i *s V^- Similarly, for N > I, N ? A aligned inputs are
checked in VO(N), although it is possible that some of these inputs are repeated. Since in
our design iV is a small number (e.g., 2 or 3), PRSs_{ is approximately I/ (N ? A).
Similarly, in each round of VT(N) there are N ? A inputs subjected to the verification.
Therefore, the probability that an adversary successfully guesses the correct digits can be
computed in the same way as the calculation of PRSs-\ in VO(N). Since there are two
rounds in VT(N), we have:
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pVT(N) _ f pVO(N),2 _ / 1 ?2 _ 1 mrRss-i - y^Rss-i I ~ ^n ? a' ~ N2 ? A2
3.5.3 Cognitive Shoulder Surfing
Let L denote the maximum number of characters that a human being can memorize during
cognitive shoulder surfing. In VO(N), the best strategy for an adversary is to memorize
[Z//4J aligned inputs. According to previous research results [38, 60] about the cognitive
capabilities of human beings, we know that [L/4\ > 1. Since each input has the same
possibility of being the secret PIN and in each login attempt the adversary can test only one
of inputs, we thus have Pcss_l = Prss-i-
In VT(N), an adversary has to make a decision about the distribution of her cognitive
capability. Let Li and L2 denote the number of characters that the adversary plan to memo-
rize in the first round and the second round, respectively. Thus, we have Pçss-i = Prss-v
as long as the following conditions is satisfied: [Li/2\ > 1, where i = 1, 2.
3.5.4 Multiple Attempts by the Adversary
Let M denote the maximum number of successive PIN entry failures allowed, before the
verifier retains the card and terminates the usage of the relevant account.
In the zero-knowledge adversary model, each random chosen input has the same prob-
ability of being the secret PIN. Thus, we have Pzk-m = M ¦ ???-?· Similarly, in the
recording-based shoulder surfing model, each recorded input has the same probability of
being the secret PIN. Thus, we have P%gs-M = M · Prss-v
As to the cognitive shoulder surfing model, in VO(I) and VO(N), if [L/4\ > M, we
have Pcss-M = M · pcss-i- Otherwise, we have:
Pcss-m = [j\ ¦ Pcss-i + (M - L§J ) ¦ ???-? (9)
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Similarly, in VT(N), if [Li/2\ > M for i = 1, 2, we have P£&_M = M ¦ P^s~v
Otherwise, we have:
Pcss-m — A ' Pcss-i + (M — A) ¦ ???-? (10)
where A = min{ \L\/2\ , [L2/2\ }. Based on Equation (10), the best strategy of an adver-
sary in the cognitive shoulder surfing model and VT(N) is to equally spread her cognitive
capability to the two rounds.
3.5.5 Summary of Security Analysis of the Rotary PIN Entry Scheme
In Table 1, we summarize the security levels of the two variants proposed in terms of the














Table 1: PJj1T1 for VO(N) and VT(N)
From Table 1, we observe that there is a trade-off between the security level against
zero-knowledge adversary and that against recording-based/cognitive-based shoulder surf-
ing. Let Nmax denote the maximum value allowed for N, taking into account the usability
concerns. Then, on one hand, VO(I) and VT(Nmax) are the most secure variants against
zero-knowledge adversary and recording-based/cognitive-based shoulder surfing, respec-
tively. On the other hand, VO(I) and VT(Nmax) are the least secure variants against
recording-based/cognitive-based shoulder surfing and zero-knowledge adversary, respec-
tively.
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In practice, in the design of a secure system, one needs to consider all the possible at-
tacks and then find an appropriate balance between different security requirements. For ex-
ample, assume that an ATM system is designed to allow only one person to enter the trans-
action area at a time. Thus, only zero-knowledge adversary and recording-based shoulder
surfing are concerned. Assume that the security requirements against zero-knowledge ad-
versary and recording-based shoulder surfing are P™£x and P^gs- ^n addition, assume
that there exist estimated probabilities that the conditions for launching a given type of at-
tacks are satisfied according to previous statistical data, e.g., reported events of card loss
or installation of hidden cameras on ATM machines. Let denote such probabilities for
zero-knowledge adversary and recording-based shoulder surfing as P9 and Pr, respectively.
During the design, we need to minimize the value of P = P^k · Pg + Prss ' P^ while at
the same time ensure that P|£r < P%f? and P%§¡¡ < P%¡£.
Apparently, the same trade-off exists when we consider the scenarios where multiple
attempts are possible and the idea of balancing security conditions based on application-
dependent requirements and risks can be readily extended to such scenarios.
3.6 Usability of the Position-based PIN Entry Scheme
Like many other security applications, there is always a trade-off between security and us-
ability. Meanwhile, usability is one of the most important factors that affect the acceptance
of a new security solution in reality.
Usability in this scheme is mainly relevant to two issues: (i) the difficulty of either
searching/identifying a specific position in the table; (ii) the difficulty of memorizing all
the positions of a PIN.
As indicated in section 3.4, the security of our design is not very sensitive to the size of
the table. Thus, a natural choice is to select a small table size, and it is helpful in addressing
both issues relevant to usability. In the following examples of design patterns, we set the
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Figure 4: An example of colored patterns in displayed tables
Figure 5: Another example of patterns in displayed tables
Another method that may improve the usability of our scheme is to use a colorful dis-
play. The basic idea is to use the contrast between different colors to enhance the identifi-
cation and memorization of the positions in a table. Thus, the following rule is proposed to
guide the design of the login interface: for any cell, at most two of its directly-connected
cells have the same color as itself, directly-connected cells refers to cells that share one
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and only one edge with each other. According to this rule, we can generate many differ-
ent displayed patterns. Two examples are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Furthermore,
in Figure 5, besides following the above rule for coloring the display, we also include the
pair of coordinates as part of information displayed on each cell so as to easily identify a
specific position. These coordinates might be of more help to users who find it easier to
remember numbers compared to remembering a set of locations or patterns.
Some users, e.g., color-blinded people, may have difficulty in color recognition but are
more sensitive to geometric shapes or paths. Thus, they may choose certain geometric
shape (or path) as the PIN, where each input/position is a vertex (or an endpoint of a sub-
path). Such a way of choosing a PIN has certain impacts on security, because the positions
of a PIN are distinct and thus the choices of positions are not totally independent. However,
we can still use Pf as an approximate estimation of Ppin- For example, our simulation
results show that there is only around 1% difference between P14 and the actual rate of
guessing the PIN, when the table size is 6.
3.7 Usability Evaluation of the Rotary PIN Entry Scheme
In order to test the usability of this rotary scheme, different variants were evaluated by a
group of twenty (7 female and 13 male) graduate students with engineering or computer
science background. The average age of participants is about 27 years old (StdDev=4.285).
At the beginning of the test session, all participants were asked to provide their opin-
ions, on a five point scale, for the following two statements: (Q 1 ) There is a need to improve
the security of current PIN entry method (Q2) I am willing to spend more time to enter my
ATM PIN if the new scheme provides more security against shoulder surfing.
After answering the above two questions, the participants were given a short introduc-
tion to the scheme in order to help them understand its design objectives. During this
introduction session, participants were also explicitly warned not to point to their chosen
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PIN digits, e.g., by using their fingers, when they are trying to align them because this
action may help reveal their PINs to shoulder surfers. Then each participant was asked to
choose a PIN number that she is familiar with and register it through our evaluation soft-
ware. Each subject was allowed to try the system for five times before the beginning of the
actual testing session. Both the short introduction above and the trial session, combined,
required about 5 minutes to complete.
During the test session, each user was asked to enter their PIN for 10 times using differ-
ent variants. The system was designed to record the PIN entry time, and count the number
of incorrect logins. Finally, after the experiment, participants were asked to (Q3) express
their satisfaction about the new system, on a five point scale. Additionally, in order to have
a more insight into the security of our scheme, participants were asked, (Q4), if they had a
specific preferences in choosing the direction of the sector in which they align their PINs.
Unlike some other graphical PIN entry scheme where complex PIN entry procedure or
the images chosen by the users might be forgotten, no follow up sessions were needed in
our evaluation process since our system require users to only remember their PINs which
is the same requirement for current PIN entry systems.
The participants' response for the first two questions are shown in Figures 3.6(a) and
3.6(b) (SA: strongly agree, A: agree, N: neutral, D: disagree, and SD: strongly disagree).
Figures 3.6(c) and 3.6(d) show the users response to the statement "I am totally satisfied
with this new PIN entry scheme" for VO(I) and VT(I).
Table 2 shows both mean PIN entry time and standard deviations for different variants
of this rotary scheme. It is interesting to note that VT(I), despite requiring two rounds
to enter the PIN, has slightly shorter mean entry time compared to VO(I). This can be
explained by the fact that many participants felt more comfortable dealing with user inter-
faces having less number of digits. It should be noted that, throughout our experiments we
used the mouse to rotate the wheels during the PIN entry process. In practical application
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where touch screens or push bottoms are available, a considerable decrease in the mean














Table 2: Mean and standard deviations of PIN entry time
None of the participants made any mistake while entering their PINs after the practice
session. Based on the feedback from participants, they felt that the system was easy to use
and does not require them to remember any new information besides their regular PINs.
As for question 4, 80% of participants said that they did not give any preference to the
position of the sector in which they align their PINs. Usually, they just tried to find the po-
sition of one digit of their PIN, then aligned the remaining digits in that position. However,
20% of participants had some preferred positions into which they aligned their PINs. For
example, one participant always tried to align her PIN towards the 12 o'clock direction,
while another participant preferred the 3 o'clock direction. Another two participants gave
preference to a random (but fixed) area of the wheel.
It should also be noted that despite the fact that the average login time using VT(I) was
less than the corresponding time for VO(I), a larger number of participants were strongly
satisfied with VO because it requires only one round for successful authentication.
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Improving the usability of security features in end user applications has been the focus of
many recent works. No matter how secure the system is, if it is too difficult to use, users will
simply drop it or try to circumvent security features. Encouraged by several psychological
studies which reveal that people are better at recognizing and recalling visual information,
as compared to verbal or textual information [40,51,71], graphical authentication schemes
(also called graphical passwords schemes) have been proposed as an alternative to text-
based passwords.
In this work, we focus on a subcategory of graphical passwords, namely, click-based
graphical passwords. While existing click-based graphical passwords (e.g., [9,42,62,63])
achieve a high level of usability, many [9, 62] of these schemes still suffer from several
security concerns such as the hotspots issue and shoulder surfing attacks. In this chapter,
we propose a click-based graphical authentication scheme inspired by Cued Click Points
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(CCP) [9]. The proposed scheme aims at maintaining the merits of the CCP style click-
based authentication solutions while improving the resistance to shoulder surfing attacks.
Different strategies are adopted in order to address the shoulder surfing issues. Moreover,
our security analysis provides a quantitative guidance on how to select the system parame-
ters based on the specific security requirements. Furthermore, a preliminary usability study
is also conducted on the proposed solution.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Related work is reviewed in section
4.2. The details of our proposed solution are presented in section 4.3, followed by security
analysis in section 4.4. Prototype implementation and usability evaluation are presented in
section 4.5.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, we review some of the recent works related to click-based password schemes.
The reader is referred to [5, 57] for further details about other graphical authentication
schemes.
Wiedenbeck et al. [62, 63] proposed a click-based graphical authentication system,
PassPoints, in which the user's password consists of a sequence of five click-points on
a given image. In the password initialization phase, a user is allowed to pick any five pixels
in an image as a password. During the login session, the image is displayed and the user
has to click on the sequence of password click-points in the correct order. Since it is hard
to require the user to click on the exact pixel, each click within a system-defined tolerance
region of the original click-point is acceptable. The security and usability of PassPoints
was evaluated by the authors [62, 63] as well as other researchers [7, 19, 59]. It was re-
ported that, although PassPoints is user friendly, it has few security concerns. The primary
security concern is the hotspots problem. This problem refers to the situation where some
portions of image are more likely to be chosen by different users. This presents a serious
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threat to the system since it narrows down the scope of guessing attacks. Another secu-
rity concern is that this PassPoints scheme is not suitable for deployment in circumstances
where shoulder surfing attacks are possible; an attacker will be able to break into the user's
account if she records the login process for one time.
Chiasson et al. [9] presented another click-based graphical password scheme named
Cued Click Points (CCP). CCP can be considered as a combination of PassPoints [62,63],
Passfaces [42] and Story [H]. In CCP, a password is one click-point per image for a
sequence of five images. The displayed image is based on the previous click-point which
provides an immediate implicit feedback to the user whether she is on the correct path of
login. The experimental results provided by the authors show that this scheme is good in
terms of speed, accuracy and number of errors. They also argued that CCP achieves a better
security level compared to PassPoints [62,63]. On the other hand, the CCP scheme still
suffers from both the hotspots problem and vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks.
In a subsequent paper [8], Chiasson et al. introduced a "persuasion" technique to their
previous CCP scheme in order to reduce the hotspots problem. Their new proposal, named
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP), utilizes persuasion to encourage users to choose
more random, and hence more secure click-points. Based on their analysis, PCCP sig-
nificantly reduces hotspots without significantly sacrificing the usability of the scheme.
However, PCCP scheme is still vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks.
4.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present the system and adversary models of our solution. Then, we
describe our proposed graphical authentication scheme.
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4.3.1 System and Adversary Models
The proposed solution can be deployed in systems where the user has a client device which
is able to display the graphical interface during the login process. We assume that the ver-
ifier is trusted to perform the authentication process correctly. During the authentication
process, the verifier keeps a record of the number of successive failed logins. After a pre-
specified number of failed attempts, the verifier may terminate the usage of the correspond-
ing accounts until they are reset through a secure channel. In addition, for convenience, this
counter is automatically reset upon a successful login.
In case of remote server logins, we further assume that all images used by the system are
stored on the server side and all communication between the client and server are protected
(e.g., through Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TSL)). In this
way, the selected click-points and their corresponding images are protected against simple
networking sniffing attacks.
4.3.2 Proposed Scheme
As mentioned above, our design is inspired by both Cued Click Points [9] and PassPoints
[62, 63]. Let / denote the set of images in the system database. Let Uu C I denote the
set of password images corresponding to user u. In this scheme, the password of user, u,
corresponds to one click-point per image for each image in Uu. In the initialization session,
user u is required to choose her password, i.e., choose one click-point per image for each
image in Uu. Let N and P denote the size of Uu and I, respectively. A successful login
response consists of one click-point per image for a sequence of S distinct images from Uu.
In other words, after the initialization session, when a user, u, wants to login to the system,
after entering the username, an image from the password set Uu will be randomly chosen
and displayed. If the user clicks on the correct point (password click-point) in the picture,
another image, chosen randomly from Uu, is displayed. Otherwise, an image from I - Uu
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is displayed. As mentioned above, this gives an implicit feedback to the user whenever she
makes a mistake. When the user clicks on the right point for a sequence of S images, the
login process will succeed. If not, an error message will be displayed, at the end of the
login process, to indicate a login failure.
4.4 Security Analysis
4.4.1 Random Guessing
To simplify our analysis, we assume that all the images used by our system have the same
dimensions and we used tolerance squares of 19 ? 19 pixels (same values adopted by
PassPoints [62, 63], CCP [9] and PCCP [8]). Following the same analysis in [9], each
picture would have about 400 valid tolerance squares.
Let Pimg denote the probability of clicking within the right tolerance square based on
random guess. Then we have
Pimg ~ 4ÖÖ' (11)
Note that the above estimate does not take into account the hotspots problem. Careful
analysis of the used images may allow the attackers to improve the chance of clicking
within the right tolerance square.
4.4.2 Cognitive Shoulder Surfing
Based on the research results related to people's short term memory, which are mentioned
in section 3.4, chapter 3, it is supposed to be difficult for a typical attacker to remember
these S click-points and their corresponding images by simply observing the login process.
Moreover, in each login session, these S images are selected from a larger set of images
corresponding to the password images set of size N > S. Thus, this sequence of S images
44
has a relatively high probability to be different in each login session.
4.4.3 Recording-based Shoulder Surfing
Compared to cognitive shoulder surfing, having access to a recording device gives more
power to the adversary. Some graphical authentication schemes designed to resist cognitive
shoulder surfing, especially click-based ones, are vulnerable to recording-based shoulder
surfing. As will be shown by our analysis, our scheme can be deployed in scenarios where
the login process might be incidentally exposed to a recording-based shoulder surfer for up
to two times.
One Login Record
As described above, in order to successfully login to a server using the proposed scheme,
the user u is supposed to click on the right click-point for each image in a sequence of
5 images which are included in the password images set Uu. If the shoulder surfer is
able to record the whole login process one time, she is able to obtain all the correct 5
click-points during this recorded session. All of these 5 images and their corresponding
click-points can be seen as a knowledge set K00 where K00 = {img^ img2, · · ¦ , imgs}.
Based on the system design, these 5 images are parts of the a user's password images set,
Uu, which consists of N images and their corresponding click-points. In order to reduce
the probability that the attacker, who tries to impersonate the legitimate user, is challenged
by the same 5 images which are recorded during a previous login session, the size of
password images set N is chosen such that N > 25. In the case where 5 < N < 25,
at least 2S-N images from the knowledge set K00 will show up for the attacker. If we
ignore the influence of hotspots, for each challenge which is not in the knowledge set K00,
the attacker has to make a guess. As discussed in section 4.4.1, the probability of making
the right guess on each unknown image is Pimg. Thus, the probability of breaking into the
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where i0 is determined based on the size of the password images set Uu as follows:
*o = <
0, N > 25
2S-N, S <N <2S
Figure 7 shows, for S = 5, how the probability of successful login by an attacker who
records one login session, is reduced by increasing N .
- record one time (proposed scheme)
-record two times (proposed scheme)
-record one time (allowing one wrong click)
Figure 7: Probability of successful attack (5=5)
Two Login Records
In this section, we assume that the attacker is able to record two login sessions. Let ?0t =
{imgi, img2, ¦¦¦ , imgK} denote the knowledge set of size S < K < 2S gained by the
attacker. Similar to the analysis of the one login record, the attacker is assumed to refer to
the knowledge set KOT whenever possible and make a random guess when the challenge
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images are not included in the knowledge set. Let ?0t denote the probability of breaking
into the system. Then we have Figure 7 shows, for 5 = 5, how the probability of successful
login by an attacker who records two login sessions, is reduced by increasing TV.
where
OT
S S pi pS-i /~tj riS-j




0, N > 35
0, 25 < N < 3S
2S-N, S<N<2S
{¿irng) s-j (13)
0, N > 35
Jo =< maz(35-7V-¿,0), 25 < TV < 35
3S-N-Í, S < N < 25
It should be noted that, while increasing the value of N clearly increases the system resis-
tance to shoulder surfing attacks, the usable value of N is limited by the cognitive capabil-
ities of the systems' users.
4.4.4 Increasing the Uncertainty of Observed User Input
Intuitively, one may think that providing some wrong information to the shoulder surfer
during the login session may increase the security level. In this section we analyze the
security of our scheme if the user is required to correctly click on exactly 5 - 1 out of 5
images during a login session. In other words, we insist that the user makes one wrong click
during the login session. We also assume that the attacker is able to record the user clicks
during one login session. In this case, unlike the original proposed scheme, if the shoulder
surfer is able to record one successful login process, one of the recorded click-points will
be incorrect.
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Assume that the user decides to choose the wrong click-point when challenged by im-
age imgwrong, 1 < wrong < S. Let Kset denote the set obtained from the the knowledge
set Kto — {imgii ^<?2) · ¦ ¦ , i'mgs} after excluding imgwrong. Again, in order to reduce
the probability that the attacker, who tries to impersonate the legitimate user, is challenged
by the same 5 images recorded during a previous session, we can set N > 25. In the case
where S < N < 25, at least 25 — N images from the knowledge set KTo will show up
for the attacker.
Since the attacker can not identify imgwrong, when imgwrong shows up, the attacker just
follows the observed user's click-point, which is not correct. If we ignore the influence of
hotspots, for each challenge which is not in the knowledge set KTO, the attacker has to
make a guess. Let Pimg denote the probability of making the right guess on each unknown
image. Then, one can show that the probability of breaking into the system is given by:




0, TV > 25
2S-N, S < N < 25
From the results depicted in Figure 7, it is clear that, for the chosen system parameters,
introducing this ambiguity in the user input reduces the security of the system because it
also tolerates one wrong click from the attacker.
4.5 Prototype Implementation and Usability Evaluation
In order to be consistent with previous PassPoints [62,63], CCP [9] and PCCP [8] studies,
we set the dimensions of all the images used in the prototype system to 451 ? 331 pixels and
the tolerance squares to 19 ? 19 pixels. The proposed scheme is implemented in JAVA and
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the experiments are conducted using a Windows-based PC which has a screen resolution of
1440 ? 900. A set of 200 images is compiled from personal collections and online websites
which provide free-for-use images. Since secure storage of passwords is outside the scope
of this work, for simplicity, our prototype system does not hash the passwords, however,
this should be done in real systems. The exact pixel coordinates are stored as metrics to
determine whether the users' click-points are tolerated or not. A snapshot of the prototype
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Figure 8: Snapshot of create password phase
In order to evaluate the usability of our proposed solution, the original proposed scheme
with settings S = 5 and N = 10 has been evaluated by a group of 20 graduate students
with engineering or computer science background (12 female and 8 male).
All participants completed an individual half an hour lab session. At the beginning, the
participants were given a short introduction to our scheme in order to help them understand
its design objectives. During this session, several life demos were shown to the participants.
We also explained that the next image in the sequence depended on whether they clicked
on the correct click-point on the current image. They were told that if they see an image
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that they do not recognize as their password image during the Confirm Password or Login
phases, then they should recognize that they have made a mistake. Participants had a chance
to practice with the scheme, for 5 minutes, before starting to collect the statistics. Users
were then asked to perform the following:
• Create Password: Create a password by clicking on one point for each 10 images
displayed in sequence. In our implementation, users can skip an image if they find it
difficult to remember the click-points in that image.
• Confirm Password: Confirm password by re-clicking it correctly. If users make mis-
takes during this step, they could reset the system to return to the Create Password
step.
• Login: Log in with already chosen passwords.
Participants were allowed to use the reset button during the Create Password and Con-
firm Password phases when they saw an wrong image or whenever they felt they can not
remember the current password.
Table 3 shows the success rate and completion time (average and standard deviation)
for the Create Password, Confirm Password and Login phases. From Table 3, it is clear
that, compared to the Login phase, a relatively longer time is required by the users in the
Create Password phase. This can be explained by noting that users have to select images
they feel easy to remember and choose click-points on them. The results in Table 3 also
indicate that, on average, about 12 seconds are enough for a user to login to the system,
which while longer than the time required to input a text based password, is still acceptable
in practical scenarios.
The last 5 minutes of each session were devoted to filling up a questionnaire about
the user's opinion on this graphical authentication scheme (see Table 4). Five-point Lik-
ert scales [69] were adopted, where 5 indicates strong agreement and 1 represents strong
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Create Confirm Login
Success Rate 102/103(99%) 93/102(91%) 86/92(93%)
Mean Time (StdDev)(in seconds) 47.3(22.5) 22.9(8.1) 12.2(4.2)
Median Time(in seconds) 41.5 20.6 11.1
Table 3: Success rate and completion time
disagreement with the given statement (SA: strongly agree, A: agree, N: neutral, D: dis-
agree, and SD: strongly disagree). Table 4 shows the mean and median scores for all the
answers. The detailed distributions for each question are shown in Figures 4.9(a), 4.9(b),
4.9(c), 4.9(d), 4.10(a), 4.10(b), 4.10(c), 4.10(d), 4.10(e) and 4.10(f), respectively.
Questions Mean Median
1.1 can easily create a graphical password 4.2
2.Logging on using a graphical password is easy 4.05
3.1 can easily remember a graphical password 3.9
4.A stranger would be worse at guessing my graphical password than a friend 3.55
5.1 prefer graphical passwords to text passwords 3.55
6.1 think graphical passwords are more secure than text passwords 4.25
7.1 think other people would choose different points than me for a graphical password 3.7
8.With practice, I can quickly enter my graphical password 4.5
9.1 think I have preference to certain points when create graphical password 4.35
10.1 think the features of images used affect my choice when I choose click-points 4.7
Table 4: Questionnaire results. Scores are out of 5.
4.5.1 Hotspots and User Choice
Based on the response for question 9 as well as post-test feedback, it is clear that partici-
pants have certain preference to certain click-points for creating their graphical passwords.
Several participants tried to select symmetric points of the images while some tried to
choose people's or animals' (e.g., cats, dogs and birds) noses or ears in the images. One
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Figure 9: Distribution of answers to questions 1-4
comer of each image as his graphical password, even though he understood that this behav-
ior was unsecure. In general, small and "clickable" points (e.g., circles, squares or letters)
were most likely to be selected by participants.
Some participants reported that some images were too difficult to be adopted as their
password images. These images were either cluttered or empty. This was expected by
us before the experiments and that was why we provided a skip button in our prototype
implementation.
One participant pointed out that with this scheme it was very difficult for him to share
password with his friends in case he had to do that. Indeed, his argument is true and it in-
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Using Mobile Devices and Browser
Extensions
5.1 Introduction
Text-based passwords are still the most common form of authentication adopted by online
service providers such as banks, online stores, and social networking sites. Generally, a
combination of a valid username/userid and a password is enough to obtain full access
to a given account. Moreover, in many scenarios, the username/userid is not considered
as sensitive information and can be easily leaked. Consequently, the protection of users'
accounts relies heavily on the protection of users' passwords which makes passwords the
hot target of identity theft criminals.
There are many techniques that are used by attackers to obtain and exploit passwords.
Among these techniques, phishing has been one of the most popular and effective ap-
proaches. It is widely adopted by attackers all over the world, partially because it is easy to
54
launch: a forged website and/or a fake e-mail is usually enough to trick novice users and
acquire their passwords and/or other sensitive information.
In addition to phishing, keylogging programs are also widely used by adversaries in
order to collect sensitive information. Sometimes, people have to enter their sensitive in-
formation using untrusted machines (e.g., using public PCs in Internet cafes), which makes
them particularly vulnerable to keyloggers. While computers in public places have a higher
probability of being infected by keylogging programs, home computers can also be infected
by such programs due to the flooding of spywares and botnets.
In this chapter, we propose a framework aiming at improving the security of online pass-
word authentication against phishing, keylogging and shoulder surfing. We also present a
prototype implementation for our design. Our solution is inspired by the idea presented
in [47]: instead of sending the user's password, pwd, in plaintext to a remote server, we
first extract the domain name of the remote server dorn and then calculate the hash value
hash(pwd, dorn), which is sent to the remote server as the password. Here, domain name
dorn works as a salt in this hash function (in cryptography, the term salt is used to denote a
string of random bits that are used as one of the inputs to a key derivation function.) This
design does not require any change to the server side. Moreover, since domain names are
unique, the hash values of passwords for any two domain hash(pwd, domi) and hash(pwd,
dom2) are very unlikely to collide. As a result, passwords acquired by phishing sites are
not useful for login at any other domain. Furthermore, in order to protect against keylog-
gers and shoulder surfing, users do not type in their passwords. Instead, these passwords
are securely stored on the users' mobile devices (such as PDAs and cell phones) and are
sent directly to the PCs through the Bluetooth link. The rest of this chapter is organized as
follows. The related work is reviewed in section 5.2. Details of our proposed solution and
prototype implementation are presented in section 5.3. Finally, the security of the proposed
framework is analyzed in section 5.4.
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5.2 Related Work
Several recent countermeasures to defend against phishing attacks have been proposed from
both academia and industry. A popular method is to develop/find distinguishing features of
phishing sites and warn the user if the features extracted from the accessed site matches
these previously determined features. This approach has been implemented in several
browser toolbars such as TrustBar [22], SpoofGuard [10], Netcraft Toolbar [39], eBay-
Toolbar [13] and SpoofStick [55]. These heuristics toolbars detect malicious URLs, and
some of them provide more information about the domain they are visiting, such as the
true domain name, location and country name, the creation date of the domain. Users are
warned when these toolbars consider or judge the visited site as fraud. Because of the inher-
ent imprecision of these heuristic methods, some users are bothered since they are required
to make the final decision whether they should trust the toolbar advice or not. Moreover,
many factors considered by these toolbars are transparent which opens a window for at-
tackers to adapt to them in order to bypass the underlying heuristics. Additionally, 13-54%
of users, who are warned by anti-phishing toolbars, ignore the warning and continue their
browsing [70].
Kirda and Kruegel [30] presented a Firefox extension, AntiPhish, that aims to protect
users against spoofed website-based phishing attacks. This solution is inspired by auto-
mated form-filler applications which usually have a master password to protect sensitive
information. Whenever the user enters information into text field elements of type text,
password and textarea, AntiPhish checks the list of previously captured values. If each
value is identical to the one just provided by the user, the domain is checked with the pre-
viously stored one. In other words, this AntiPhish tracks the sensitive information of a user
and generates warnings whenever the user attempts to submit sensitive information to a
website which is considered to be untrusted by the application.
Parno et al. [41] proposed a mechanism, Phoolproof, that leverages a trusted device
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to perform mutual authentication between client and server. This solution eliminates re-
liance on perfect user behavior, thwarts Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks and protects
users' account information against keyloggers and most forms of spywares. Phoolproof
is a two-factor authentication system in which the trusted device works as an additional
authenticator. Therefore, the attacker must compromise the trusted device and the user's
credentials in order to impersonate the user. A long-term secret is required to be stored on
the mobile device, and most cryptographic operations are conducted on the trusted mobile
device. As mentioned by the authors, this design is vulnerable to session hijacking attacks
and needs modification on the server side.
Mannan et al. [36] presented a simple approach, using a mobile device, to strengthen
the authentication process from an untrusted computer. In their design, the user's long-
term secret is cryptographically separated from the untrusted computer which means that a
client PC can only access temporary secrets even though most computations are performed
in this untrusted PC. The user's long-term secret (typically short and of a low-entropy) is
input through a trusted personal device such as a mobile phone or a PDA. The long-term
secret is never stored in this personal device. The trusted personal device only provides a
user's long-term secret to the client PC after encrypting the secret with a pre-installed and
valid public key of a remote server. This proposed solution is intended to protect sensi-
tive information from various attacks such as keylogging, phishing and pharming attacks,
as well as to provide transaction security to foil session hijacking. However, in order to
achieve these goals, a modification of the server side is mandatory.
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5.3 Proposed Solution and Prototype Implementation
5.3.1 Main Idea
Nowadays, computers and mobile devices with Bluetooth functionality are very common.
Moreover, in many practical scenarios, these mobile devices can be consider as trusted
devices or at least far more trustworthy than PCs. Based on this observation, we argue that
it is better to shift the sensitive login burden from untrusted computers to these relatively
more trusted devices (e.g., cell phone).
As mentioned above, the password sent to the server is constructed by hashing the user
supplied password, pwd, with a salt value obtained from the login site. The objective of
using a salt in the password hashing process is to generate different passwords for different
domains. Thus, the generated password will be resistant to spoofing websites because the
domain of a spoofed site is very likely to be different from the genuine one. Different
possible values can be considered as candidates for the salt such as the domain name of the
site hosting the current page and the SSL certificate of the target domain. As mentioned
in [47], different choices have their own advantages and disadvantages. However, based
on the availability and security concerns, the current domain seems to be the most suitable
choice to be used as a salt. For instance, using SSL certificate has several drawbacks such
as being hard to replicate manually. It also suffers from compatibility problems when the
target site has no SSL certificate.
Some popular websites have multiple domains for different countries or territories. For
instance, eBay has ebay.ca for Canada and ebay.cn for China. So when a user creates
an account using ebay.ca as a salt, it is not possible for the user to login to the site for
China. On the other hand, if a user creates an account at ebay.ca, usually the user should
seldom login to ebay.cn. Even if the user has to do so, she can just create a new account
for the specific domain name in this situation. Yahoo and Wikipedia have a different way
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to organize their domain names. For example, the domain name for Yahoo Canada is
ca.yahoo.com while the domain for Yahoo China is cn.yahoo.com. In this scenario, we
can just extract the two top-level domains and use them as the salt for all the domains that
match "*.yahoo.com". Fortunately, most sites only have one consistent domain.
Another challenge that we faced is that some sites have special restrictions on the
chosen passwords in order to force users to avoid choosing weak or easy to guess pass-
words. Some of these restrictions require that the password should contain at least one
non-alphanumeric character and/or at least one uppercase character. In order to overcome
this problem, the hash encoding algorithms, running on the mobile device should satisfy
various restrictions imposed on the servers' passwords (e.g., by including at least one up-
percase, one lower case, and one numeric character in its output.)
5.3.2 System Architecture
Our prototype implementation consists of three components: a J2ME program (MIDlet)
installed on the mobile phone, a Java desktop application on the PC and a Mozilla Firefox
extension.
The first component of the system is a MIDlet application running on the user's mobile
phone. This program, which can run on any J2ME-enabled mobile phone, receives the do-
main name of the current login page, from the Java application running on the PC, through
Bluetooth communication. Then it searches this domain name in a lookup table which
contains all the websites that the user wants to secure using this framework. If a match is
found, the user is required to input the corresponding username and password. Users can
either choose to input their credentials manually into this MIDlet, or call the saved creden-
tials in the mobile phone. The security implications of both options are further discussed
in section 5.4.2. Before being sent to the Java application on the PC, the username remains
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the same while the password is hashed using the following pseudorandom function (PRF):
PRFpu,d{dorn) = hash(pwd, dorn), (15)
where the user's password pwd is used as the key while the website's domain dorn is used
as input to the PRF. In other words, as mentioned above, dorn is used as the hash salt.
The second component of our solution is a Java application that has to be installed on
the computer running the browser. It receives the URL of the current login page from the
Firefox extension, and then forwards it to the MIDlet through the Bluetooth link. Once the
user sends the credentials to this Java application, it forwards them to the Firefox extension.
The third component of our solution is a Firefox extension which extracts the URL
of current login page, and sends it to the desktop Java application. It then waits for the
response from the desktop Java application. After receiving the username and hashed pass-
word from the desktop Java application, this extension passes them to the web server. Our
solution does not require any modifications to the server side.
Figure 1 1 illustrates the main components of the prototype and information flow among
them. In what follows we provide a more detailed description for these components.













Figure 1 1 : Architecture and information flow of the proposed solution
60
Firefox Extension
Similar to many add-ons of the Firefox Browser, our extension is developed in XML User
Interface Language (XUL) and JavaScript. The developed extension works as a toolbar
added to the Firefox Browser, which is activated by the user who presses a "start" button
whenever the user wants to login to a remote server using our solution. The functionality
of this extension is to extract the current URL of the login page and send it to the desktop
Java application as an asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) request. It then waits for
the reply from the desktop Java application. Once the response is received, this extension
extracts the username, hash value of the password from the response string, and fills them
in the login page. In the password field, the star symbols (*) appear instead of the symbols
and characters of the typed password. When the extension tries to fill the username field
automatically, it searches certain id values for the username from the source code of the
login page. Most websites use common ids for the username field, such as Email (Google
Gmail), username (Yahoo Mail) and email (Facebook). If this extension can not identify
the username field from the source code of the login page, then the user is prompted to
manually input the username into the username field. Throughout our experiments, we did
not face this problem for the password field that has the statement type = "password" .
Desktop Java Application
The desktop Java application works as an information relay station between the Firefox
extension and the MIDlet. We can separate this application into two parts: http server
module and Bluetooth module. We were not able to use socket communications in order
to establish a communication link between the Firefox extension and this Java application
because JavaScript does not support sockets for security reasons. Instead, AJAX technique
is chosen in the solution for this specific communication requirement. In order to adopt
AJAX, one part of desktop Java application is developed as a simplified http server which
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opens the http service at the localhost of the computer using port 18000 (the selection of
port 1 8000 is arbitrary. The reader is referred to [23] for further details about port numbers.)
This http server keeps checking for the AJAX request from the Firefox extension. After
receiving the request, it parses it and sends the domain name to the Bluetooth module.
Whenever this http module receives the credentials from the Bluetooth module, it forwards
them to the Firefox extension as an AJAX response. The Bluetooth module is developed
using bluecove 2.1.1 which is a Java API for Bluetooth. This module has two threads: a
client thread and a server thread. The client thread (discovery thread) searches for new
Bluetooth devices. Whenever a new device is found, a service search is performed to
the found device. If the service is found successfully, a connection is established to this
device. On the other hand, the server thread waits for new connections from other Bluetooth
devices. After the connection is constructed with the MIDlet of the mobile phone, the
communication channel is open. When this module receives the domain name of the login
page from the http server module, it forwards it to the MIDlet. Then, it keeps checking for
the response of the MIDlet. Whenever the Bluetooth module receives a response from the
MIDlet, it passes it to the http server module.
MIDlet
A MIDlet is an application conforming to the Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP)
standard. In order to develop MIDlets for mobile phones, some infrastructure is needed.
Sun provides a wireless toolkit for Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC),
namely, Sun Java Wireless Toolkit 2.5.2 (WTK 2.5.2). Our MIDlet is divided into the
following three modules: Bluetooth module, Hash module and Record Management mod-
ule. Similar to the desktop Java application, this Bluetooth module also has two threads:
a client thread and a server thread. When this module receives the domain name from the
desktop Java application through the Bluetooth channel, it searches the domain name in
62
a lookup table which contains all the websites that the user wants to associate with this
solution. If the domain name matches one item in the table, the user is prompted to input
the corresponding username and password. Otherwise, an error message is displayed. Two
options are then provided to the user. If the user decides to input the username and pass-
word manually, the record management module will not be activated. However, the user
can also call the saved credentials using the record management module. The password
is then hashed using SHA-256 which returns a 256 bit message digest. The generated re-
sult is Base64 encoded which yields a 28 character string. Then the string is shrunk to a
pre-specified length (e.g., 10). The length can be adjusted depending on the server side
requirements. Finally, the generated hashed password and the username are sent to the
desktop Java application through the Bluetooth channel.
In order to use our system, the Firefox extension and the Java application are assumed
to be installed in the computer running the user's browser. In many scenarios, users may not
have the access privileges to install two modules on the used computers (e.g., computers in
Internet cafe). To address this issue, a secondary option is provided by the MIDlet through
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to help users generate their hashed passwords where the
user only needs to input the password and the domain name. Then, the MIDlet computes
and displays the hashed password to the user who can then input it in the password field of
the login page using the keyboard of the browser's computer.
5.4 Security Analysis of the Proposed Solution
In this section, we investigate some security threats associated with our solution.
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5.4.1 Security of the Bluetooth Link
Since the hashed version of the password is sent from mobile phone to the PC through the
Bluetooth channel, the security level of this part definitely affects the overall security of
our solution. When the Bluetooth connection between mobile phone and computer is set
up without activating the link encryption, it can be easily eavesdropped. Moreover, it is
also easy for an attacker to replace the original payload data with other data. Thus, when
our solution is deployed, link encryption between these two units must be activated.
In Bluetooth, encryption is perfomrmed using the stream cipher E0 [66]. The core of E0
is built on four independent linear feedback shift register (LESR) and a finite state machine
as a combining circuitry which introduces sufficient nonlinearity. A detailed analysis of this
algorithm is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, in here, we summarize some known
attacks on E0. Jakobsson and Wetzel [28] pointed out two attacks on the E0, the first of
which is of O(210°) time complexity while the other one requires 0(263) time effort using
234 observed symbols. Fluhrer and Lucks [15] presented an attack on E0 using observed
keystream and the public knowledge of the encryption mechanism. This attack can recover
the initial state of E0 in 0(268) using 243 observed or known cleartext. However, since the
required number of known symbols is very large compared to the symbols in a frame, the
proposed attack can not directly reveal the link key. Krause [32] reported a more powerful
attack on E0 in terms of the required number of symbols. This attack has a time complexity
of 0(277) while only requires 128 known symbols. An improved correlation attack is
presented by Golic [16] which achieves 0(27°) time complexity using less than one frame
of known symbols. Courtois [17] also presented an attack which requires 0(249) time
complexity if 223'4 bits are available to the attacker. While the above attacks on the E0
cipher are of complexity less than 0(2128), which is the complexity of exhaustive search
through the key space, the effort required by all these attacks is impractical and does not
present any threat to our implementation.
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In order to avoid the high time complexity of a direct attack on E0, one may try to
attack the Bluetooth link during the pairing procedure. Prior to Bluetooth 2.1 specification,
Bluetooth technology was somewhat sensitive to passive and active attacks on the pairing
procedure. However, in Bluetooth 2.1 + EDR, a new feature called Secure Simple Pairing
(SSP) is introduced in order to increase the level of security. Now, the latest specification
of Bluetooth is Bluetooth 4.0 which also supports the SSP.
In summary, if link encryption is activated between the mobile phone and the PC, the
Bluetooth communication channel can be considered as a secure channel for our solution.
5.4.2 Storing Credentials on Mobile Phones
As mentioned before, users can choose to store their credentials in the mobile phone and
call the saved credentials whenever needed. Otherwise, users may choose to input the
credentials to the MIDlet manually. If users choose the former, it is easy for them to
conduct the authentication process since they do not need to be bothered by typing in this
information. However, saving credentials on the mobile phone may have some security
implications, e.g., if the mobile phone is lost or stolen. A master password which protects
unauthorized access to the mobile device may mitigate this risk. On the other hand, the
manual credential entry option may not be convenient for some users, especially when they
are not used to the cell phone small keypad. In conclusion, users can choose either one of
these options depending on their specific needs and security requirements.
5.4.3 Phishing Attacks
Using the proposed solution, each site would receive a hash value of the password with
domain name as a salt. Moreover, since the domain names are unique, the hash values of
passwords for any two domain hash(pwd, domi) and hash(pwd, dom2) are almost certain
to be different. Consequently, when a phishing site receives the hash value of the user's
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password , the attacker can not use this value to directly hijack the user's account. However,
it is possible for the attacker to launch an offline dictionary attack. A straightforward
method to mitigate this problem is to use the so called slow hashfunction, which is already
widely implemented in the UNIX system to increase the computing resources needed to
launch a dictionary attack [21,45].
5.4.4 Shoulder Surfing Attacks
According to our design, users can choose to store their credentials on the mobile phone.
When they are required to input these credentials, they can simply retrieve them. In this
case, it is impossible for shoulder surfers to obtain the users' passwords. On the other
hand, some users may prefer not to store their credentials on the mobile phone and input
their passwords manually, which opens a small window for shoulder surfers. However, the
task of the shoulder surfer is much harder in this case because the keypad of the mobile
phone is much smaller than the PC. Also, many mobile phones use one key to control
three or more characters. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the probability to mount a
successful shoulder surfing attack is very slim in this scenario. Another possible chance
for shoulder surfing is when users have to use the secondary option (see section 5.3.2) to
generate the hashed passwords and enter them using the keyboard of the PC. In this case,
the hashed passwords might be leaked to the shoulder surfer, especially when the shoulder
surfer has some recording capabilities.
5.4.5 Keylogging Attacks
In the normal setup of our solution, the keyboard of the computer is not used to input
any sensitive information. Instead, all the sensitive user's credentials are sent directly by
the mobile device to the Firefox application. Even if the keylogging program has some
features such as screen grabbing, it will still not be able to acquire any useful credentials
66
from the users. However, our solution might be vulnerable to sophisticated keyloggers that
are able to monitor communications on certain ports or webform grabbers that can get web
submissions. In order to defend against this threat, we can apply the one time password
(OTP) technique to the proposed solution. In particular, we can replace hash(pwd, dorn)
by hash(pwd, dorn, time).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Today, users' sensitive information is severely threatened by many prevalent attacks. Through-
out this work, we focused on three threats raised by identity thieves: shoulder surfing threats
to terminal applications (e.g., ATM, PoS and PDA), shoulder surfing of click-based graph-
ical passwords and phishing attacks.
In order to address the shoulder surfing threats against terminal applications, we pro-
posed two shoulder surfing resilient PIN entry schemes that achieve a good balance between
security and usability. Our analysis shows that, our position-based scheme is resilient to
shoulder surfing, given that the attacker has limited capability in recording the login pro-
cess. Different variants of the proposed rotary scheme display a trade-off in resisting differ-
ent types of adversaries, and thus the selection of the appropriate scheme can be optimized
considering the types and frequencies of risks encountered in the application.
To defend against shoulder surfing attacks on click-based graphical passwords, we pro-
posed a shoulder surfing resistant click-based graphical password scheme. Our security
analysis indicates that the proposed solution offers a good level of security when the at-
tacker's capability of recording the login procedure is limited, while still provides promis-
ing results in term of usability.
We have also proposed an approach to strengthen the authentication process aiming at
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protecting users' sensitive credentials of the Internet services. The proposed solution pro-
vides improved security against some prevalent attacks (e.g., shoulder surfing and phishing
attacks) to Internet authentication progress. An advantage of our proposed solution is that
it can be directly deployed to some current services without the need to change the server
side.
While the above proposed solutions present a good addition to the tools and methods
that can be used to defend against identity theft, further research is required to address other
practical issues that were not addressed in this work.
In particular, a thorough and long term usability study of the proposed PIN entry and
click based graphical password schemes is required. This study should address the long
term memory of users, an issue which was not addressed by our usability tests.
Quantifying and mitigating the threat raised by the hotspots issue in graphical pass-
words is another interesting, yet challenging, research direction.
While the proposed solution, in chapter 5, provides resistance against many classes of
attacks, it does not address the Man-in-the-middle (MITM) threat. Modifying this scheme
to defend against this class of attack is another promising research direction.
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